In the standard formulation of mechanism design, a key assumption is that the designer has reliable information and technology to determine a prior distribution on types of the agents. In the meanwhile, as pointed out by the Wilson's Principle, a mechanism should reply as little as possible on the accuracy of prior type distribution. In this paper, we put forward a model to formalize and quantify this statement.
Introduction
Many standard auction settings assume that buyers' prior distributions are common knowledge among all buyers and the seller. For example, the seminal Myerson's auction [17] uses this distribution knowledge to calculate virtual values. However, this assumption does not necessarily hold in practice: when facing fresh new buyers, the seller may not know anything about the buyers' valuations. Even with repeated interactions, the seller still needs to infer the buyers' valuation distributions from the past bids by some, possibly inaccurate, algorithms. Such inaccuracy in type distributions may compromise the theoretical optimality of prior-dependent mechanisms.
The model
In this paper, we propose a model where buyers can credibly manipulate the prior distributions. In our model, each buyer has a true type distribution, just as in the standard mechanism design formulation. However, each buyer can pretend as if his type is from another distribution, which we call the fake distribution. The way that he convinces others, including the seller, that his type is indeed drawn from the fake distribution, is by consistently playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium in the mechanism, as if his distribution is the fake distribution. Such equilibrium is desirable as long as the buyers can commit to the fake distributions and doing so increases their respective payoffs.
The model captures a number of important ingredients in practical mechanism design. First of all, it captures the fact that prior information is not endogenous to the model, but has to come from the agents' past data. For example, in sponsored search auctions [11] , it becomes standard that the prior distributions are estimated from the past bids [18, 19, 6] . Secondly, it captures certain dynamic aspects of mechanism design in that it does not focus on the analysis of a specific round but on the steady state resulted from a long, converged sequence of plays. In our model, this steady state corresponds to a Bayes Nash equilibrium under the fake distributions. Thirdly, it helps explain certain underbidding behaviors in prior-dependent auctions. Many truthful auctions in standard setting are no longer "truthful" in fake distribution setting. For example, again in the sponsored search domain, it is known that 1 agents tends to underbid and a prior-dependent auction often yields lower revenue than the theoretical anticipation. Last but not least, the model allows one to quantify the damage caused by relying on prior information and to prescribe more accurately the outcomes one should expect in these auctions.
Consider the Myerson's auction where there are two buyers, each with valuation drawn independently identically from uniform distribution on [0, 1] . Assume that the first buyer always bids his true valuation. In other words, the buyer's bid distribution is also a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We are interested in what the second buyer would behave. Suppose that the second buyer consistently bids a small positive number . By observing the bids distributions for a sufficiently long period, the seller would believe that the buyer's valuation from uniform [0, 1], while the second buyer valuation is exactly .
In the Myerson's auction,the first buyer's virtual value is 2v 1 − 1 when his true type is v 1 , while the second buyer's virtual value is always . The item is allocated to buyer two if and only if 2v 1 − 1 < , of which the probability is ( + 1)/2. As a result, the second buyer obtains an expected utility of . Compared to the case where the second buyer commits to the truthful distribution (i.e., uniform [0, 1]) and obtains an expected utility of 1/12, his utility strictly increases. We will rigorously prove later that both buyers reporting a uniform distribution on [1/4, 1/2] is an equilibrium in the induced (distribution-reporting) game.
One might argue that the model assumes too much rationality on the buyer side, since the buyers need to figure out the equilibrium of fake distributions. One justification is that, the agents may not need to compute the correct fake distribution upfront, but can learn to do this over time via some learning dynamic and converge to the correct distributions in the steady state as mentioned.
Our contributions
We report a few interesting findings when applying this model to a number of commonly seen single-item auctions. To justify why we can focus on truthful auctions, we first prove a version of revelation principle for this model, stating that one can without loss of generality to restrict attention to truthful auctions.
Our first result states that Theorem 1.1 For any prior independent mechanism family, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer to report his true distribution.
We then apply this model to the revenue-optimal auction, aka. the Myerson auction. We prove one of our main theorems that states the Myerson auction under the equilibrium of fake distribution is strategically equivalent to the first price auction under the true distribution in the standard setting. Theorem 1.2. Given buyers' true distributions, the induced distribution-reporting game of Myerson auction is strategically equivalent to first price auction in the standard setting.
As a result, the two games are revenue equivalent as well. In other words, Myerson's revenue in the fake distribution setting is reduced to the revenue of the first price auction game in the standard setting.
We extend our analysis to a similar prior-dependent auction that has been studied in the literature, called second-price auction with monopoly (i.e., Myerson's) reserve [14, 10] . Theorem 1.3 Given that the buyers' true distributions are i.i.d regular, the revenue of secondprice with monopoly reserve under the equilibrium of fake distribution is the same as the revenue of second-price auction under the true (or equivalently, fake) distribution.
It is important to distinguish Myerson auction and second-price auction with monopoly reserve, even in the i.i.d case. The allocation rules of the two auctions are the same under the true distribution, but different when computing the equilibrium of fake distributions: to consider a possible deviation, a buyer can report any fake distribution, creating an instance of non-i.i.d distributions.
We further generalize the idea of reserve pricing by analyzing second price auction with a fixed or random reserve [15, 10] . Theroem 1.4 Given that the buyers' true distributions are i.i.d, the revenue of second-price auction with any single-sample (aka. random) reserve under the equilibrium of fake distribution is no more than the revenue of second-price auction under the true distribution.
We finally apply this model to a class of truthful auctions called virtual efficient auctions, in which the allocation rule is efficient, with respect to a generalized definition of virtual value function. We show that, in this setting, Theroem 1.5 Given that the buyers' true distributions are i.i.d, the revenue of any virtual efficient mechanism family under the equilibrium of fake distribution is no more than the revenue of secondprice auction under the true distribution.
To sum up, for all symmetric cases, second-price auction is superior in revenue compared to other auctions considered in this paper. The revenue comparison of Myerson auction and secondprice auction is unknown in the asymmetric case since the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of First-price auction in this case is still unknown [7, 20] .
Relative work
Recently, there has been a large body of literature on the problem of prior-independent mechanism design [1, 2, 8, 12, 13] . One of the major motivations of these papers is the so-called Wilson's principle [21] , which states that a mechanism should reply as little as possible on the prior distributions. Over the years, the principle has guided generations of auction design and has been consistent with experiences from practice: auctions that heavily rely on prior distributions are in general not robust and rarely used. Our model can be regarded as a quantitative model for the Wilson's principle.
Devanur et. al. [9] propose a repeated game model where the buyer who has a prior distribution continuously interacts with the seller, and analyze in each round how the seller updates the prior distributions. Our model, even though admits a dynamic interpretation, is still essentially a singleshot distribution-reporting game. Caillaud and Robert [5] consider implementation of Myerson's auction in a prior-independent fashion. They assume that at least one buyer knows the prior distribution of the winning buyer. Izmalkov [16] also discusses the implementation of the revenue maximization auction via English auction by shill biddings. While both work and ours are related in that we all study mechanism design from the perspective of priors, our goal is different in that we focus on the study of strategical manipulation of prior distributions.
The fake distribution model
In a single item auction, an auctioneer has a single item to sell to n buyers. Each buyer i has a private valuation v i towards the item, where each v i is drawn from a distribution F i . Bulow and Roberts [3] give a convenient representation of a distribution called quantile, which we heavily use in this work.
is a mapping from the quantile space to valuation space, and is uniquely determined by distribution F .
We denote v(·) as the distribution of v in the quantile space. Note that q is always uniformly distributed on [0,1] and v(·) is weakly monotone decreasing. Denote R(q) = qv(q) as the revenue curve of distribution v(·).
Denote q = (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) the profile of quantiles for all bidders. Define F as the set of all weakly monotone decreasing functions that maps [0, 1] to R + . We write f (·) = (f 1 (·), f 2 (·), ..., f n (·)) ∈ F n for the profile of n arbitrary distributions in F n . Now we suppose that each v i is drawn from distribution v i (·) ∈ F. We write v(·) = (v 1 (·), ..., v n (·)) for the profile of valuation distributions. Sometimes we call this profile the true distributions. In our setting, the true distributions v(·) is unknown to the seller 2 .
In our model, each buyer reports a new distributionv i (·) that may be different from v i (q), called the fake distribution. We usev(·) = (v 1 (·), ...,v n (·)) to denote the profile of fake distributions.
Definition 2.2. (Mechanism)
Given prior f (·), a (direct) mechanism consists of an allocation rule x i : R n + → [0, 1] and a payment rule t i : R n + → R.
Note that both x i and t i are implicitly dependent on the prior. This motivates the following definition of mechanism family, which explicitly addresses this fact to distinguish from the standard definition of a mechanism.
Definition 2.3. (Mechanism Family)
A mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n } is a collection of mechanisms, one for each prior, so that each mechanism M f (·) in it take f (·) as the prior.
Under a mechanism, we use function b i (·) : [0, 1] → R + to denote bidder i's bidding strategy. Given prior f (·), bidding strategy profile b(·) = (b 1 (·), ..., b n (·)) and buyer i's quantile q i , define the interim allocation as follows:
and interim payment as follows:
In order for the seller and other bidders to verify the fake distribution, the bidders need to play a Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism, under the fake distribution profile. Formally Definition 2.4. (Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE)) Given Mv (·) , the bidding strategy profile b(·)
If the bidding strategy profile b(·) =v(·) is a BNE, we say the mechanism Mv (q) is Bayes
With the notations ready, the timing of our model can be conveniently described as follows:
1. The seller commits to a mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n }.
2. Buyers choose fake distributionsv(·).
3. Buyers play BNE of the mechanism Mv (·) .
Denote Φ is the set of all one-on-one mappings φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. We, as analysts, are interested in the equilibrium of the induced game:
Definition 2.5. (Induced game) Given a mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n }), the induce game is a normal-form game (N, A, U ) where
.., n} is the set of buyers,
to denote an action of buyer i. This means that, the buyer not only needs to choose a fake distributionv i (·), but also needs to explicitly use φ i (·) to map the true distribution to the fake distribution, from quantile to quantile.
• U = {U 1 , ..., U n }: the utility function for each buyer.
The necessity of φ i (·) follows from the definition of utility of the induced game. In the definition above, U i : A → R denotes the utility function of buyer i, such that
are the interim allocation and the interim payment respectively in mechanism Mv (·) at BNE.
After buyer i reporting a fake distributionv i (·), by the definition of φ i (·), buyer i will bid as if his valuation isv i (q), when his true valuation is v i (φ(q)). We will prove in next section that each buyer i will always want to choose φ i (q i ) = q i , ∀q i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize his utility. As a result, we can omit φ from the definition of the induced game and equivalently write A i = F for short.
Givenv(·),
Game theoretical notions, such as Nash Equilibrium and best response are according to standard definitions in the induced game. We sometimes refer to Nash equilibrium simply as equilibrium in the induced game.
Definition 2.6. Givenv(·), the seller's revenue is
Technical preliminaries
In this section, we present several technical lemmas useful for the analyses of equilibrium in the induced game of various mechanism families. As mentioned, we only focus on the truthful mechanism families. This is justified by the following revelation principle for mechanism families. It states that, it is with loss of generality to restrict attention to mechanism families where every mechanism in it is BIC.
Lemma 3.1. (Revelation principle for mechanism families) For any mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n }, and given a BNE for each M f (·) , there exists a new mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n }, such that each mechanism M f (·) is BIC and implements the same outcome as M f (·) at its truthful BNE. Moreover, ifv(·) is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game of M , it is also a Nash equilibrium of the induced game of M A mechanism family is truthful if every mechanism in it is BIC. With this lemma, we only consider truthful mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n } and the truthful BNE of every mechanism in it.
In the following, we use the interim notations and analyze from the point of view of buyer i as if he is the only buyer. In the following, we omit the subscript i when it is clear from the context. Lemma 3.2. For any truthful mechanism family and fixedv(·), the mapping φ(q) = q, ∀q ∈ [0, 1] maximizes the buyer's utility among all possible one-on-one mappings.
In other words, in the induced game, the buyer will always want to map a value that is in quantile q in the true distribution to a value that is also in quantile q in the fake distribution, no matter what the fake distribution is.
Proof. By definition, the buyer's utility in the induced game is U =
When the buyers' fake distributions are given, x * (q) and t * (q) are constants.
By the property of BIC, we have that x * (q) is decreasing in q. Since φ(q) is a mapping over [0, 1], by the Rearrangement Inequality, we have
This lemma also holds for non-truthful mechanism family, since monotone decreasing x * (q) is the necessary condition of a BNE.
Use the same approach as Myerson's analysis, we first prove the payment identity formula using the quantile representation. Lemma 3.3. (Payment identity) In a BIC mechanism Mv (·) , supposev(·) is continuous, then the interim allocation x * (q) is monotone decreasing in q. Moreover, given the buyer's quantile q, the interim payment is
Proof. All missing proofs can be found in the Appendix.
It is well known that the payment identity formula using the valuation representation [17] is given by
wherev are used as a shorthand forv(q), and let t * (0) = 0.
Formulas (1) and (2) are essentially the same, but (2) is still useful for cases where x * (v) are well defined for value v out ofv(q)'s range. We will sometimes use (2) instead of (1). In fact, we will show in appendix that it is sufficient to only consider continuous, bounded fake distributions in (1) . So WLOG, we can make this assumption throughout the paper. Lemma 3.4. Given fake distribution profilev(·), the expected utility of the buyer is
where r(q) =v(q) + qv (q).
r(q) is known as the virtual value (in [17] ).
Lemma 3.5. Given the fake distribution profilev(·), the expected revenue is
Lemma 3.5 follows directly from Lemma 3.4 and Definition 2.6.
Prior-independent mechanism family
We first analyze the easy case where the mechanism family under consideration is independent of priors. We show that in any such mechanism family, it is a weak dominant strategy for each buyer to report the true distribution.
Definition 4.1. (Prior-independent mechanism family) A mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n } is prior independent if it is truthful, and take any bid
By definition, second-price auction (SPA) is prior independent mechanism family, while the Myerson auction, second-price auction with monopoly reserve price, are not prior-independent mechanism family. Theorem 4.2. For any prior-independent mechanism family, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer to report the true distribution in the induced game.
Proof. Fix other buyers' reportsv −i (·) and the quantile q of buyer i. By definition of priorindependent mechanism family, regardless of the whole fake distributionv(·), x * (q) is all the same for each mechanism and only depends on the single value atv(q). We write x(v(q)) = x * (q) to reflect this observation.
By (2), the buyer's interim utility
Note that the term is independent to any other the valuev(q ) such that q = q, so we can maximize
So the buyer will always want to report v(q) = v(q) at quantile q. In addition, the buyer's utility increases asv(q) approaches v(q).
The Myerson auction
In the fake distribution setting, we show that the Myerson auction is strategically equivalent to the first price auction in the standard setting.
We first consider the case where we restrict the set of possible fake distributions to regular distributions, i.e., the virtual value r(q) =v(q) + qv (q) is weakly decreasing.
For each i, given buyer i's fake distributionv i (·) and bid
where G i is the cumulative distribution function onv i (·) and g i is the probability density function.
Definition 5.1. A mechanism M f (·) in the Myerson mechanism family allocates the item to the buyer with the largest positive virtual bid φ(b) (with respect to f (·)). (If no buyer has positive virtual bid, the seller keeps the item). The payment rule is according to Lemma 3.3, with base payment
Under any regular fake distribution profile, it is a truthful mechanism family. Fix other buyers' fake distributionsv −i (·), the quantile q of the buyer and the value of r(q), the interim allocation is the same for each mechanism in the Myerson family. As a result, we can write x(r(q)) = x * (q) to reflect this observation. @Yulong, rewrite the paragraph above. First of all, there is no Lemma 4.2. Second, the above statement is entirely unclear.
Theorem 5.2. In Myerson mechanism family, for fixedv −i (·), one of the buyer's best response of the induced game isv
Furthermore,v(q) is weakly monotone decreasing and regular.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. For fixedv −i (·), by Lemma 3.4, the buyer's best responsev(q) maximizes
Denote
). The problem becomes to find a r(·) that maximizes
In particular,v
Given such r(q), we solve the differential equation r(q) =v(q) + qv (q),q ∈ [0, 1] to getv(q). One of the solutions isv
In order to ensure that suchv(q) is a distribution and is regular, we need to show the monotonicity ofv(q) and r(q). To prove the monotonicity of r(q), for any q < q, by definition of r(q):
Add them together we have
Since v(q) ≤ v(q ), by the monotonicity of x(r), we get r(q) ≤ r(q ). Given the monotonicity of r(q), note that
And by r(q) =v(q) + qv (q) we getv (q) < 0. 
So the buyer 1's best response in the isv 1 (q) = . Let → 0, buyer 1 guarantees a constant allocation probability x * 1 (q) = 1 2 for any q, with the payment tends to 0. The utility is 1 4 , larger than 1 12 , the utility buyer one gets when reporting the true distribution. Proof. Given the other buyer's fake distributionv −i (q) = 1 2 − 1 4 q, so the corresponding virtual value curve r −i (q) = 1−q 2 . So x(r(q)) = P r q∈[0,1] [ 1−q 2 ≤ r(q)] = 2r(q). By (5), buyer i's utility is
For the equilibrium in Lemma 5.4,
. Compared to the Myerson auction in the standard setting: U 1 = U 2 = 1 12 , REV = 5 12 , SW = 7 12 , the equilibrium in the induced game yields higher buyer utility and social welfare, but less revenue. As a result, it is desirable for the buyers to commit to such fake distributions.
We now prove our main theorem of the section, the equivalence between Myerson auction in the fake distribution model and first price auction in the standard model.
Note that the utility of Myerson mechanism family only depends on the virtual value function r(·), i.e., for a set of fake distributions that corresponding to a same virtual value function, (the differential functionv(q) + qv (q) = r(q) has multiple solutions ofv(q)), the buyer has the same utility. So we can simplify the buyer's action to reporting the virtual value function r(q), instead of reporting the fake distributionv(q).
To describe the main theorem of this section, we first rewrite the induced game of Myerson mechanism family in an equivalent way as follows:
Definition 5.5. The induced game of Myerson mechanism family given true distribution profile v(·) is a normal-form game (N, A, U ) where • N = {1, ..., n} buyers, indexed by i.
.. = A n = F. We use r i (·) ∈ F denotes an action of buyer i, in other words, the action of buyer i is to choose a virtual value distribution.
• U = {U 1 , ..., U n }, where U i : A → R denote the utility function of buyer i such that (from (5))
where x M is the allocation vector in Myerson mechanism, taking n buyers' virtual values as inputs.
Consider a standard first-price auction (FPA) with type distribution profile v(·), which is a Bayesian game. The buyer's bidding strategy is a function b(q) : [0, 1] → R that maps each quantile (equivalently, value) to bid.
Lemma 5.6. In first-price auction, given buyers' bidding strategy profile b(·), buyer i's expected utility is
where x F is the allocation vector in first-price auction, given n bids as inputs.
Proof. In FPA, for a fixed quantile profile q, the buyer pays his/her bid if he/she get the item, and pay 0 otherwise, so the utility is
As an result, the expected utility is
In th same spirit as we defined for induced game of Myerson mechanism family, we can regard the first-price auction as a normal-form game, where each player's action is simply choosing a bidding strategy, and the utility is the expected utility defined above. Formally, Definition 5.7. The induced game of first-price auction given type distribution profile v(·) is normal-form game (N, A, U ) where • N = {1, ..., n} buyers, indexed by i
.. = A n = F. We use b i (·) ∈ F denotes an action of buyer i, in other words, the action of buyer i is to choose a bidding strategy.
• U = {U 1 , ..., U n }, where U i : A → R denote the utility function of buyer i such that
It is natural to only consider decreasing bidding strategy in FPA, since it is not hard to show that any non-decreasing bidding strategy is weakly dominated by a decreasing bidding strategy.
Theorem 5.8. Given v(·), the induced game of Myerson mechanism family (N, F n , U 1 ) is identical to the induced game of FPA (N, F n , U 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 5.8. To verify that U 1 and U 2 are the same function, we need to prove that given the same input, i.e, b(·) = r(·), we have U 1 (b(·)) = U 2 (r(·)).
In fact, x * F and x * M are exactly the same function: Given a quantile profile q, FPA allocates the item to the buyer with the largest bid b(q), and the Myerson mechanism allocates the item to the buyer with the largest virtual value r(q). As b(·) = r(·), the two utilities are indeed the same. This proves the theorem.
See again Lemma 5.4, it is well known that the BNE for first price auction is b(v) = v 2 for valuation distribution uniform in [0,1]. So the virtual value of fake distribution r(q) = v(q) 2 = 1−q 2 , same as the proof of Lemma 5.4.
Given this result, it is easy to prove the monotonicity of r(q). Since r(q) is the optimal bidding strategy in the corresponding FPA, it is monotone.
All results so far extend to the case where we allow the buyers to report any, possibly irregular fake distribution. The Myerson auction also extends the general distributions via ironing, a procedure that maps the irregular distribution to a regular distribution, then run Myerson mechanism for the ironed distributions. All our results in this section remain the same, because whenever a buyer reports an irregular distribution, it is equivalent to report the ironed distribution instead.
Second-Price Auction With Monopoly Reserve
Second-price auction with monopoly reserve [14] is an auction that first rejects all the bids below the respective monopoly reserves and run second-price auction on the remaining bids. Since we allow buyers to report any distributions, we need to extend the definition of monopoly reserve to the irregular case. We begin by reviewing Myerson's ironing procedure. For any distribution f (·) (regular or irregular) with revenue curve R(q) = qf (q). Define R(q) be the smallest concave function such that R(q) ≥ R(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1]. R(q) is called the ironed revenue curve. The derivative of ironed revenue curve r(q) = R (q) is called the ironed virtual value.
Given a distribution f (·), the quantile q * such that r(q * ) = 0 is called the reserve quantile for distribution f (q). The value f (q * ) is called the monopoly reserve price for distribution f (q). If there are multiple reserve quantiles, set the reserve quantile to be the largest one (i.e., the smallest type whose virtual value equals 0).
Definition 6.2. (Second-price auction with monopoly reserve (SPAMR) mechanism family)
For any mechainism M f (·) in a SPAMR mechanism family, it first computes the monopoly reserve price for each buyer i and then allocates the item to the buyer with the largest bid b which is not less than the monopoly reserve price. (If no buyer satisfies this, the seller keeps the items). The payment rule is according to Lemma 3.3 and the base payment is set by x * i (1)f (1) − t * (1) = 0. Clearly, this is a truthful mechanism family. Lemma 6.3. For any distribution f (q) with revenue curve R(q) = qf (q), its reserve quantile q * satisfies q * = arg max q∈[0,1] qR(q) (breaking tie by choosing the largest quantile)
Proof. Since R(q) is convex hull of R(q), their maximum points remain the same. So arg max R(q) = arg max R(q), and by definition q * = arg max R(q) = arg max R(q) Givenv −i (·) and the quantile q for the buyer, following a similar argument as in Theorem 4.2, the interim allocation probability is the same across all mechanisms in the SPAMR mechanism family, as long as the reserve price ofv(·) and the value ofv(q) are both fixed. We write x * (q) = x(v(q)) to reflect this observation.
So unlike Theorem 4.2, reporting truthfully now leads to a potentially bad reserve price and thus may no longer be a dominant strategy.
In this section, we assume that the true distributions v(·) are regular. We then further consider two cases: in this first case, the mechanism family allows buyers to report any fake distributions, while in the second case, the mechanism family only allows buyers to report regular fake distributions.
Case one: general fake distribution
Denote q * as the reserve quantile of v(·) (where the revenue curve qv(q) get its maximum), and denote R * = q * v(q * ). q * and R * are constants given the true distribution. Denoteq * as the reserve quantile ofv(·), and denote R =q * v (q * ).q * and R are to be determined. Note that by Lemma 6.3, the reserve pricev(q * ) = R q * is also fixed. Directly from the proof of Theorem 4.2, u * (q) increases for all q < q * , asv(q) approaches v(q). So the buyer's utility also increases. Lemma 6.6. It is without loss of generality to considerv(·) subject to R ≤ R * .
Proof. Suppose R > R * = v(q * )q * . We change the distributionv(·) as follows: for all q <q * such that qv(q) > R * , setv(q) = R * q . After the change, everyv(q) get closer to v(q) and the reserve price decreases. (Note that after the change the reserve quantileq * remains the same.) By Theorem 4.2, each interim utility u * (q) increases for all q < q * . Since for q > q * , the utility is always 0, we can conclude that the overall utility increases.
So we only need to consider the case where R ≤ R * . Since v(·) is a regular distribution, qv(q) is concave with q. Denote q 1 , q 2 as the two intersection points between revenue curve qv(q) and straight line y = R. (If R = R * , set q 1 = q 2 . If v(1) > R, set q 2 = 1). It's easy to see that it is not optimal whenq * < q 2 . Denote q 3 as the quantile of the intersection between revenue curve y = qv(q) and straight line ((0, 0), (q * , R)). If v(1) > R, set q 3 = 1, otherwise q 3 always exists and q 2 < q 3 < 1. Lemma 6.7. For fixed R subject to R ≤ R * and fixed reserve quantileq * , it is without loss of generality to considerv(·) with the following form.
• For q s.t.q * < q < 1,v(q) can be any value less than R q * ,
(the revenue curve ofv(q) is the red line (line Oq 1 q 2 q 3q * ) in Figure 1 .
Proof. Given R andq * fixed, the feasible domain ofv(q) is [ R q * , R q ], i.e. the revenue curve qv(q) in figure 1 should below the line y = R and above the line ((0, 0), (q * , R)). Then by Lemma 6.5 we should choose the value in the feasible region that is the closest to v(q), so the revenue curve of the best response distribution is the red line (line Oq 1 q 2 q 3q * ). Figure 1 : Best response to SPA with Myerson reserve Lemma 6.8. For fixed R, and supposev(q) has the form in Lemma 6.7, it is without loss of generality to setq * = 1.
We leave the proof in the appendix. Lemma 6.9. For fixed R, the buyer's utility by reporting the best response distribution described in Lemmas 6.7 and 6.8 is given by,
Lemma 6.10. For any buyers' true distributions that are i.i.d regular , if v(1) = 0 and the best response given by Lemma 6.7 and 6.8 is unique, then there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium of fake distribution.
Proof. v(1) = 0 implies that q 2 , q 3 < 1. Assume by contradiction that if there exists a symmetric equilibrium, we usev(q) to denote the fake distribution in equilibrium. By Lemma 6.7 and 6.8, the equilibrium of fake distribution have a point mass on [q 3 , 1], where all buyers' fake types are equal to the reserve pricev(1) = R. The mechanism must deal with tie-breaking in this case. Note that when q ∈ [q 3 , 1], this part of utility is
So, to maximize utility, the buyer wants to minimize x(R). Whatever the tie breaking rule is, all buyers can always deviate by using R − instead of R. The first three terms in Lemma 6.9 will vary by an infinitesimal, while in the last term, x(R) vary from a negative non-infinitesimal to 0, and the whole term will increase by a non-infinitesimal amount. So it is not an equilibrium, unless allv(q) equal 0. But it's easy to check thatv(q) = 0 is not an equilibrium either. Contradiction.
It remains to show that the best response of fake distribution is unique. We have following lemmas and leave the proofs in the appendix. Lemma 6.11. For any buyers' true distributions that are i.i.d regular and do not have a point mass, the symmetric equilibrium of fake distribution can not have a point mass. Lemma 6.12. For any buyers' true distributions that are i.i.d regular and do not have a point mass, if there exists a symmetric equilibrium of best response of fake distribution with fixed R and reserve quantileq * , then the best response of fake distribution given by Lemma 6.7 is unique. Theorem 6.4 then follows from Lemmas 6.11 and 6.12.
Case two: regular fake distribution
In this subsection, we focus on the case where buyers can only report regular fake distributions. Any mechanism family can achieve this by leaving buyers who reporting irregular fake distribution 0 utility.
In this setting, the revenue curve of fake distribution is a concave function. Denoteq * as the reserve quantile (where the qv(q) is maximized), then from 0 toq * , qv(q) is weakly increasing. Denote R =q * v (q * ). Theorem 6.13. There exists a quantile q 0 such that it is without generality to considerv(·) with the following form
We call the corresponding q 0 the incident quantile of the buyer. Theorem 6.14. In SPAMR family, for the case that the buyers' true distributions are i.i.d regular, the revenue yielded by the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the induced game is equal to the revenue of the SPA under the true distribution. Lemma 6.15. It is without loss of generality to considerv(·) subject toq * = 1.
Proof. Ifq * < 1, setv(q) = R q for all q ∈ [q * , 1]. The utility increases by
Proof of Theorem 6.13. First of all, by a similar argument as in Lemma 6.6, we have R ≤ R * .
By Lemma 6.15, we can assume WLOG thatq * = 1. So the revenue curve qv(q) is monotone increasing in [0,1]. Denote q 2 as the quantile of the intersection between qv(q) and the right part of revenue curve qv(q) (q ∈ [q * , 1]). If q 2 does not exist (i.e. v(1) >v(1)), set q 2 = 1.
For all q ∈ [0, q 2 ], since qv(q) is increasing,v(q) ≤ q 2v (q 2 ) q . By Theorem 4.2,v(q) should be the value in this region that is the closest to v(q), i.e.q = min{ q 2v (q 2 ) q , v(q)}. Denote q 1 the quantile of the intersection between straight line y = q 2v (q 2 ) and the left part of revenue curve qv(q), q ∈ [0, q * ].
For q ∈ [q 2 , 1], setv(q) = q 2v (q 2 ) q , which is the minimum possible value of revenue curve. After this change, the reserve pricev(1) weakly decreases, and allv(q) gets closer to v(q). By Theorem 4.2 the total utility increases.
To sum up, the fake distributionv(·) has the form in the Theorem 6.14, and satisfies concavity and monotonicity.
When the buyer fixes the incident quantile, the best response of fake distribution is determined. For each buyer i, denote q i as the incident quantile. Lemma 6.16. Buyer i's utility of reporting the best response in Lemma Theorem 6.13 is
In an equilibrium of the induced game, dU 1 q 1 = dU 2 q 2 = ... = dUn qn = 0 Lemma 6.17. Suppose n = 2 and true distributions are i.i.d regular, for symmetric equilibrium of the induced game, the incident quantile q 0 (identical to both buyers) satisfies
Proof. Consider the derivative of U to q 0 .
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium,
Let the formula above be 0 concludes the proof. Example 6.18. For n = 2 and the buyers' true distribution are i.i.d from uniform [0,1], i.e. v 1 (q) = v 2 (q) = 1 − q, then the following fake distribution is the equilibrium distribution.
Proof. By Lemma 6.17, we have q 0 − 1 +
The revenue in the example is REV = 2
Compared to SPA in the standard setting, buyer's utility and social welfare increase, while the revenue remains the same. This is not a coincidence. In the following, we prove Theorem 6.14 that says for i.i.d, regular true distributions, the revenue of the equilibrium in SPAMR equals to the revenue of SPA in standard setting.
Proof of Theorem 6.14. For simplicity here we only prove the case when n = 2.
By Theorem 6.13 and Lemma 3.5
By Lemma 6.18, we have (1−q 0 )q 0 v(q 0 ) = 1 q 0 qv(q)dq Combine together we get REV = 2 1 0 qv(q)dq Note that the revenue of second-price auction is
This lemma holds for the n i.i.d buyers case, we leave the proof for this case in the appendix.
Second-price with reserves in quantile
We start this section by defining the following mechanism family: Definition 7.1. (Second-price auction with constant quantile reserve (SPACQR)) For a quantile q r ∈ [0, 1], each mechanism M f (·) in the mechanism family allocates the item to the buyer with largest bid b subject to b ≥ f (q r ) (If no buyer satisfies the constraint, the seller keeps the items). The payment rule is given by Lemma 3.3.
Again, this is clearly a truthful mechanism family. If the distributionv(·) does not have a point mass, the mechanism is the second-price auction with reserve pricev(q r ). In particular, when q r = 1, the mechanism is just the second-price allocation with base payment such thatv(1)x * (1) − t * (1) = 0 Whenv −i (·) and reserve quantile q r are fixed, for the same reason as in Theorem 4.2, for a given q and a given value ofv(q), we can write x * (q) = x(v(q)). Lemma 7.2. In SPACQR mechanism family, the following is a dominant strategy for the buyer at quantile q,
Proof. Givenv(q r ), the directly from Theorem 4.2 we know the utility increases asv(q) approaches v(q), for all q < q r . sov(q) = max{v(q),v(q r )} Asv(q r ) decreases, the reserve price decreases andv(q) get closer to v(q). So all the interim utility u * (q) increases. As a resultv(q r ) = 0,v(q) = v(q) for all q < q r In this mechanism, buyers can eliminate the effect to the constant quantile reserve by reporting the fake distribution above. The seller gets less revenue compared to the revenue obtained in the second-price auction, for any q r > 0. We now consider an alternative mechanism family that uses a random quantile reserve. Definition 7.3. Second-price auction with random quantile reserve (SPARQR)
Each mechanism M f (·) in the mechanism family first a random drawn q r from uniform [0, 1], and allocate the item to the buyer with largest bid b subject to b ≥ f (q r ) (If none of the buyers satisfies the constraint, the seller keeps the items). The payment rule is derived by Lemma 3.3.
Theorem 7.4. In the SPARQR mechanism family, if n buyers' true distributions are i.i.d, the revenue under the equilibrium of the induced game is no more than the revenue of second price auction under the true distribution.
If the distribution v(·) does not have a point mass, the mechanism is known as the single sample mechanism [15] .
Fixv −i (·), for any realized value of q r , as long as q ≥ q r , for the same reason as before, we can write x * (q) = x(v(q)), or x * (q) = 0 if q < q r Lemma 7.5. For n = 2 and i.i.d true distributions, fake distributionv(q) subject to v(q) = v(q) − qv (q) and v(1) =v(1) is weakly decreasing and is an equilibrium distribution of the induced game.
Proof. See appendix.
Example 7.6. If n = 2 and both buyers' true type distributions are i.i.d from uniform [0,1] uniform, thenv(q) = 1 − q + q ln q is an equilibrium.
Note that ln q > q−1 q so v(q) ≥ 0,v (q) = ln q ≤ 0, which is a feasible distribution.
Proof of Theorem 7.4. See appendix.
Virtual efficient mechanism family
Most auction family in the single-item case can be regarded as a comparison of specific "virtual value" [4] , in which each mechanism allocates the item to the buyers with the largest "virtual value" and the payments are set according to Lemma 3.3. Here, the "virtual value" is defined with respect to a buyer's fake distribution. In this section, we consider a class of truthful mechanism family in which the "virtual value" R can be written as a simple functional of the fake distributionv(q), i.e., R = R(q,v(q),v (q)). For the buyer with fake distributionv(q), in value space, we define R equivalently, i.e., R(v) = R(v, G, g), where G is the cumulative distribution function onv(q) and g is the probability density function. Given a bid b, denote R(b) as the "virtual bid" . Definition 8.1. In a virtual efficient mechanism family (VE), each mechanism allocate the item to the buyers with the largest "virtual bid" R i (b i ). The payment rule is set according to Lemma 3.3 and the base payment is set by x * (1)v(1) − t * (1) = 0.
Note the Myerson mechanism and second-price with monopoly reserve are not included in this definition, since both auctions use the ironed virtual value r(q), which can not be written as a simple functional for irregular fake distributions. Lemma 8.3. For a truthful, VE mechanism family, if the "virtual value" R can be written as a simple functional of fake distributionv(·), i.e., R = R(q,v(q),v (q)), then ∂R ∂v (q) = 0, ∂R ∂q ≤ 0, ∂R ∂v(q) ≥ 0.
Proof. Since the mechanism family is truthful, for any fake distributionv(·), the allocation rule is monotone. Then dR dq ≤ 0 for any decreasing functionv(·), so for any q ∈ [0, 1]
For any given q,v(q),v (q), if ∂R ∂v = 0, setv (q) to be a sufficiently large value (for positive ∂R ∂v ) or sufficiently small (for negative ∂R ∂v ), then the left side of (7) is positive, contradiction. So ∂R ∂v = 0. Given this, for any given q,v(q), setv (q) = 0, from (7) we get ∂R ∂q ≤ 0. Setv (q) sufficiently small, we get ∂R ∂v(q) ≥ 0. Now, consider a buyer with true type distribution v(·). Fix the other buyer's fake distribution, given quantile q, his interim allocation can be written as a function of R, and by Lemma 8.3, x * (q) = x(R(q,v(q))) Lemma 8.4. For a truthful, VE mechanism family, in the i.i.d case, if there exists a symmetric equilibrium, then the fake distributionv(·) in equilibrium satisfiesv(q) ≤ v(q) for any q.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. The revenue on equilibrium of fake distribution is
Substitutev for v we get the revenue of second-price auction 1 0 (n − 1)(1 − q) n−2 v(q)dq By Lemma 8.4, we get REV ≤ REV 2 .
APPENDIX B Missing proofs form section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For any q < q, by BIC we have,
, so x * (q) is monotone decreasing. For second part, we denote u(q) = x * (q)v(q) − t * (q), (10) becomes
substitute q by q + , and let → 0, we get
Integrate over q we have u(q) = − 
For discontinuous cases, if the allocation rule is well defined for the bid in discontinuous area, we regard the interim allocation as a function of valuev and using (2) instead.
If the allocation rule is well defined for the bid in discontinuous area, we appoint that the allocation is setting to be the minimum subject to the monotonicity.
As a result, we have the following:
Lemma B.1. For any auctions considered in this payer, all results for any discontinuous or unbounded distribution are limitations of series of continuous and bounded distribution.
Proof. For any fake distributionv(·), consider the following distribution f (·):
Then f is a continuous function that as → 0, f →v(q). For any unbounded distributions, it can be approached by taking its truncations at higher and higher values. The truncate distribution is bounded.
All our results for unbounded or discontinues are approached arbitrarily well by the series of continuous and bounded distribution.
C Missing proofs form section 6
Proof of Lemma 6.8. By Lemma 6.7 we assume w.l.o.g. that R < R * . q 1 , q 2 , q 3 are define in Figure  1 
, which is uniquely determined by q 3 .
We compute the derivative of U to q 3
< 0
Lemma C.1. For n buyers with i.i.d. regular true type distribution, the revenue of second-price with Myerson's reserve mechanism family on equilibrium of fake distribution (regular fake distribution only) equal to that of the second-price auction.
Proof. Using the same notations as Lemma 6.17. In this case,
Substituting this into (6) and let dU dq 0 = 0 we get
The revenue
D Missing proofs form section 7
Proof of Lemma 7.5. When the reserve quantile is q r , by definition, the buyer utility is qr 0 x(v(q))(v(q)− v(q) − qv (q))dq, so the expected utility is
This is a functional optimization problem. Denote F = (1 − q)x(v(q))(v(q) −v(q) − qv (q)). The Euler-Lagrange equation yields
, for n = 2 and in symmetric equilibrium x (v) = − 1 v (q) . We get
Set a particular solutionv(1) = v(1) we can get the solution of the differential equation.
To show the monotonicity ofv(·), taking the derivative of
Actually, this is functional maximization problem in which both endpointsv(0),v(1) are variables. So the functionv(q) need to satisfy the natural boundary condition:
It is automatically satisfied. As a result, when all buyers' fake distributions satisfy v(q) =v(q) − qv (q), it is an equilibrium. Sincev(·) is feasible, and satisfy the Euler-equation and natural boundary condition.
Proof of Theorem 7.4. We first prove the case of n = 2.
In SPARQR, the revenue from one buyer is,
The revenue from one buyer in second-price auction is
Lemma D.1. For n buyers with i.i.d. true type distribution, the revenue of single sample mechanism family on equilibrium of fake distribution is no more than the revenue of the SPA under the true distribution.
Proof. Using the same notations as Theorem 7.4. , In this case,
Set the particular solutionv(1) = v(1), then we get the solutionv(·). Then we show the monotonicity ofv(·). Assume by contradiction that there exists a q 1 s.t. v (q 1 ) < 0. From (10) we havev(q 1 ) > v(q 1 ).
Consider the first minimum quantile q 2 ∈ (q 1 , 1) s.t.v(q 2 ) ≤ v(q 2 ), sincev(1) = v(1) q 2 must exists. Then for all q ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ), by (10)v (q) > 0. Sov(q 2 ) >v(q 1 ). Therefore v(q 2 ) ≥v(q 2 ) > v(q 1 ) > v(q 1 ), it contradicts with the decreasing monotonicity of v(·).
So we proved thatv(·) is the feasible solution (Note that the nature boundary condition is automatically satisfied). (q)(−q 2 (n − 2)(1 − q) n−3 + 2q(1 − q) n−2 + q(1 − q) n−2 (n − 1))dq Therefore, when n >= 3, , by the monotonicity ofv(q), we have x(R(q,v(q)))(v(q) −v(q) − qv (q))
We regard this as a functional ofv(·) and denote functional F = x(R(q,v(q)))(v(q) −v(q) − qv (q)). By Euler-Lagrange equation, we get F some other mechanism family In this section we discuss two special mechanism families. Definition F.1. (Mechanism family with target distribution v(·))
The mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n }, set all the allocation rule to 0 in all mechanisms, except one special mechanism M f (·) such that f i (q) + qf i (q) = v i (q) for any i.
Define M f (·) as following: Allocate the item to the buyer with the largest virtual value f (q) + qf (q) and set base payment t * (1) such that u * i (1) = x * i (1)v(1) − t i (1) = 0. The payment rule is according to Lemma 3.3 (give slightly disturb so that buyers can get positive utility).
Lemma F.2. Given buyers' true valuation distributions v(q), the mechanism family with target distribution v(q) can extract almost all the social surplus, i.e.,
REV =
Proof. By definition, the only equilibrium for buyers arev i (q) = v i (q), for any i, otherwise they both will get 0 utility.
In mechanism M f (·), from definition we know that, fix the quantile profile ·, the revenue is the maximum virtual value of f i , that is max v i (q).
However, this mechanism only performs well when buyers have the exact true type distribution. It gets 0 revenue at all other cases. Since the prior distributions are private information, the seller can not design this kind of mechanism family in advance.
In next mechanism we will show that the revenue gap between normal setting and fake distribution setting can be infinite.
Definition F.3. (Mechanism family with respect to quantile) The mechanism allocate the item to the buyer whose corresponding quantile of the bid b ,i.e., 1 − F (b), is minimum. The payment rule is according to Lemma 3.3 and set base payment t(1) such that x * (1)v(1) − t * (1) = 0.
It is a truthful mechanism family. Lemma F.4. For mechanism family with respect to quantile, the revenue gap between normal setting and fake distribution setting can be infinite.
Proof. Consider symmetric environment, in normal setting, i.e.,v(q) = v(q), by payment identity the revenue is equal to the revenue of second-price auction with prior distribution v(q). In fake distribution setting, since buyer's interim allocation rule is not related tov(q) (x * (q) = 1 − q), the buyer can report a fake distributionv(q) = 0, so that the total expect payment is 0. Note that by definition the seller always guarantees a non-negative revenue, so this fake distribution is an equilibrium of fake distribution, of which the revenue is 0.
So the revenue gap can be infinite.
